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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Interplay Among Paragraphs of Section 302(a)
It is conceivable that a given activity may constitute both a
tort under section 302 (a) (2) and a transaction of business under
section 302(a) (1). In Totero v. World Telegram Corp.,16 the
defendant, columnist Robert Ruark, was a Spanish resident (i.e.,
domiciliary). He mailed his articles from Spain to the defendant
United Features, a corporation doing substantial business in New
York. This corporation distributed his work to, among others,
the defendant World Telegram Corporation, with which defendant
Ruark had no contractual arrangement. It was alleged that one
of Ruark's articles defamed the plaintiff. Although the action
was for libel, jurisdiction could not be predicated on section
302(a) (2), since a cause of action for defamation is expressly
excluded by that paragraph. To avoid this prohibition, the
plaintiff claimed that the cause of action arose from Ruark's
transaction of business within New York, thus predicating jurisdic-
tion on section 302(a) (1). 17
In denyifig the defendant Ruark's motion to dismiss the
complaint because of lack of in personam jurisdiction, the court
held that Ruark's activity of sending articles into New York and
the distribution of them by United Features pursuant to a contract
with Ruark, together constituted a "transaction of business" by
Ruark despite the fact that the defamation could not be supported
by section 302(a) (2). Such a determination appears to conform
to the Revisers' intent. They recognized that the transaction of
business within the state might be a sufficient jurisdictional basis
for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in a defamation
case, although the defamation itself is excluded as a tort under
section 302(a) (2).18
1641 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
17 The plaintiff's contention on this point is supported by the "Practice
Commentary" to McKinney's CPLR § 302. The Commentary states that
"if the defamation grows out of the transaction of business in New York,
the preceding subdivision [§ 302(a) (1) ] would ensnare the defendant since
no exceptions are made therein for defamation." 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR§ 302, commentary 433.
18 SFCOND' REP. 39. According to Weinstein, Korn and Miller, jurisdic-
tion in a defamation action can be sustained under § 301 if the corporation
is doing business in New York, or, if an individual, he is served within the
state. 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 1 302.11(1963). While the Revisers contemplated the use of § 302(a) (1) for
defamation actions, expressly excluded under the tort provision of §
302(a) (2), there is danger that the legislative purpose will be subverted by
too frequent resort to § 302(a) (1) to admit that which § 302(a) (2)
expressly excludes.
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